Pace Law Review
Volume 41

Issue 2

Article 6

August 2021

Blockchain and Its Potential Real-World Applications: Implications
on Discovery Procedures
Ross M. Keiser

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Ross M. Keiser, Blockchain and Its Potential Real-World Applications: Implications on Discovery
Procedures, 41 Pace L. Rev. 228 (2021)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/6
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more
information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

Blockchain and Its Potential Real-World
Applications:
Implications on Discovery Procedures
Ross Keiser 1*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.THE BIRTH OF BITCOIN: BLOCKCHAIN ORIGINS.....................229
II.BLOCKCHAIN ILLUSTRATION ................................................232
III.HOW BLOCKCHAIN WORKS .................................................233
IV.PUBLIC, PRIVATE, AND PERMISSIONED BLOCKCHAINS ........ 237
V.ALTERNATE USES FOR BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY .............. 242
VI.DISCOVERY PROCEDURES FOR BANKING TRANSACTIONS .... 245
VII.JUDICIAL NOTICE ...............................................................248
VIII. PUBLIC POLICY OF COST SAVING ....................................253
IX.CONCLUSION .......................................................................254
Bitcoin has become a ubiquitous household name in the past
ten years. 2 Its value has been wildly volatile. 3 In December of
2017, Bitcoin hit nearly $20,000 a coin, making those who had
the stomach to weather the storm fabulously rich (or richer). 4
Just this past year, Bitcoin returned to its meteoric highs. 5 Its
success has launched it into the spotlight, sparking both fervent

1 * Ross Keiser is a third-year law student at the Elisabeth Haub School
of Law at Pace University. Special thanks to his colleagues, family, and
friends, many of them computer programming professionals, for their help
forwarding sources and answering many questions.
2. Elizabeth Schulze, Bitcoin Turns 10: The Obscure Technology that
Became a Household Name, CNBC (Jan. 4, 2019, 10:03 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/04/bitcoin-turns-10-the-obscure-technologythat-became-a-household-name.html.
3. Jay Adkisson, Why Bitcoin Is So Volatile, FORBES (Feb. 9, 2018, 11:40
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jayadkisson/2018/02/09/why-bitcoin-is-sovolatile/#36011a3b39fb.
4. See Ali Montag, Why Cameron Winklevoss Drives an “old SUV” Even
Though the Twins Are Bitcoin Billionaires, CNBC (Jan. 12, 2018, 3:33 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/12/winklevoss-twins-are-bitcoin-billionairesyet-one-drives-an-old-suv.html.
5. Nathaniel Popper, Bitcoin Hits New Record, This Time with Less Talk
TIMES
(Nov.
30,
2020),
of
a
Bubble,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/30/technology/bitcoin-record-price.html.
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criticism 6 and tremendous praise. 7
Although many can now recount a story within their lives
regarding Bitcoin (or any other of the more than 1,600 various
cryptocurrencies that exist 8), many still do not understand it.
Even those with careers in economics or finance find it puzzling. 9
More specifically, many do not understand what tangible value
Bitcoin has and why it has had such a wild ride.
Many resources exist for those who wish to learn more about
cryptocurrency. This Comment, however, seeks to demystify
what is at the center of every cryptocurrency—its underlying
technology—blockchain, its numerous applications to real world
market sectors, and the effect it can impose and has imposed on
the legal landscape. In order to understand the value of
blockchain technology, one must first understand the
environment in which it emerged. Bitcoin is famous for being
the first application of this technology, but why was it created?
I.

THE BIRTH OF BITCOIN: BLOCKCHAIN ORIGINS

The idea for a trustless, decentralized banking ledger
originated from the mistrust of banks following a global
recession. In 2008, the financial crisis was in full effect. 10 The
world had previously seen a number of respected institutions fall
at the hands of risky financial derivatives trading. 11 Banks had,
6. Kate Rooney, Warren Buffett Says Bitcoin Is a ‘Delusion’ and ‘Attracts
Charlatans,’
CNBC
(Feb.
25,
2019,
12:50
PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/25/warren-buffett-says-bitcoin-is-adelusion.html.
7. Aaron Hankin, Bitcoin Boosted by IMF Chief Christine Lagarde’s
(Apr.
17,
2018,
3:14
PM),
Praise,
MARKETWATCH
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/bitcoin-gets-boost-from-imf-head-201804-17.
8. Reza Jafery, New to Cryptocurrency? Start Here: A Cryptocurrency,
Bitcoin, and Blockchain Crash Course, MEDIUM (July 3, 2019),
https://medium.com/swlh/new-to-cryptocurrency-start-here-44cc5a6d6626.
9. Kai Sedgwick, People Who Don’t Understand Cryptocurrency Should
Probably Stop Writing About It, BITCOIN.COM (Feb. 26, 2018),
https://news.bitcoin.com/people-who-dont-understand-cryptocurrency-shouldprobably-stop-writing-about-it/.
10. Sher Verick & Iyanatul Islam, The Great Recession of 2008-2009:
Causes, Consequences and Policy Responses (Inst. for the Study of Labor,
Discussion Paper No. 4934, 2010).
11. Kimberly Amadeo, AIG Bailout, Cost, Timeline, Bonuses, Causes,
Effects, THE BALANCE (Aug. 16, 2020), https://www.thebalance.com/aig-bailoutcost-timeline-bonuses-causes-effects-3305693; Editorial Staff, Bear Stearns
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deservedly, become the derided pariah of society, due to
essentially gambling with their customers’ mortgage premiums,
pensions, retirement funds, and IRAs. 12 People were feeling the
burn of a record number of foreclosures 13 and a widespread effect
on the global economy. 14 People lost trust in banks and various
governments’ ability to oversee and regulate them. 15
Enter “Satoshi Nakamoto.” 16 In October of 2008, Nakamoto
published a paper titled “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash
System.” 17 His paper outlined the underlying deficiencies and
inefficiencies of the current banking system. 18 Namely, as
consumers, banking customers are required to “trust” banks to
act as middlemen for the majority of daily financial
transactions. 19 Unless one runs an all cash business, consumers
and businesses are required to store money in the bank and rely
on the banking system to facilitate and “verify” the transactions
as they occur. 20 As only a relatively small number of banking
institutions exist, the facilitation of these transactions are
Collapses, Sold to J.P. Morgan Chase, HISTORY (Mar. 13, 2020),
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/bear-stearns-sold-to-j-p-morganchase; Virginie Montet, ‘Lehman Weekend’: the Biggest Bankruptcy in
American History, PHYS.ORG (Sept. 2, 2018), https://phys.org/news/2018-09lehman-weekend-biggest-bankruptcy-american.html.
12. Kimberly Amadeo, The Stock Market Crash of 2008, THE BALANCE
(Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.thebalance.com/stock-market-crash-of-20083305535.
13. Les Christie, Foreclosures Up a Record 81% in 2008: Filings
Continued to Soar Through the End of the Year—and There’s No Relief in Sight
MONEY
(Jan.
15,
2009,
3:48
AM),
for
2009,
CNN
https://money.cnn.com/2009/01/15/real_estate/millions_in_foreclosure/.
14. JEAN-YVES HUWART & LOÏC VERDIER, ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION:
ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES 126–45 (2013).
15. Peter Thal Larsen, Banks Were First to Fall in Decade of Lost Trust,
REUTERS (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-financialcrisis2008-breakingviews/breakingviews-banks-were-first-to-fall-in-decade-oflost-trust-idUSKCN1M1191.
16. Olga Kharif, John McAfee Vows to Unmask Crypto’s Satoshi
Makamoto, Then Backs Off, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 23, 2019, 6:06 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-23/john-mcafee-vows-tounmask-crypto-s-satoshi-nakamoto-within-days.
It is unknown whether
“Satoshi” is a real person or merely a pseudonym of an individual or a group of
individuals.
17. Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System,
BITCOIN 1 (Oct. 31, 2008), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 2.
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centralized to a small number of global players, allowing them
to essentially monopolize via their market share and, therefore,
have free reign over consumers’ money. 21 The unwitting
consumer, with no option but to utilize these “transaction
facilitators,” is at the whim of these large global companies,
trusting they will not misappropriate the funds in self-dealing
transactions. 22 In addition, the centralization of transaction
facilitators creates a weak point that hackers and bad actors can
exploit. 23 When there is only one server, these actors need only
gain access to that one server to do whatever they will with the
information they find. 24 This has led to numerous security
breaches in the financial sector, with millions of customer
accounts impacted and compromised. 25
Satoshi invented Bitcoin as an “electronic payment system
based on cryptographic proof instead of trust, allowing any two
willing parties to transact directly with each other without the
need for a trusted third party.” 26 Satoshi sought to recreate the
positive aspects of banking, such as being relatively cheap,
reliable, and verifiable, while leaving the negative aspects of
necessary trust and centralization behind. 27 The system Satoshi
created to meet these goals is called “blockchain.” Based on
cryptography and Peer-to-Peer networking, blockchain utilizes
the same Peer-to-Peer structures as “BitTorrent,” a
21. Id. at 1.
22. Id.
23. Justin Pritchard, How Blockchain Is Changing Banking and
BALANCE
(Sept.
17,
2020),
Financial
Services,
THE
https://www.thebalance.com/how-blockchain-is-changing-banking-andfinancial-services-4174354.
24. Deborah Bodeau & Richard Graubart, Cyber Resiliency Design
Principles: Selective Use Throughout the Lifecycle and in Conjunction with
Related Disciplines 10 (MITRE Corp. Technical Report No. MTR17001, Jan.
2017),
https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/PR%20170103%20Cyber%20Resiliency%20Design%20Principles%20MTR17001.pdf
(“Assets that are common to multiple missions or business functions are
potential high-value targets for cyber attackers, either because those assets
are critical or because their compromise increases the attackers’ options for
lateral motion or persistence.”).
25. Ellen Zhang, The Top 10 FinServ Data Breaches, DIGITAL GUARDIAN
(May 8, 2019), https://digitalguardian.com/blog/top-10-finserv-data-breaches.
26. Nakamoto, supra note 17, at 1.
27. See id.; see also Frequently Asked Questions: What Are the Advantages
of Bitcoin?, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/faq#what-are-the-advantages-ofbitcoin (last visited Aug. 9, 2021).
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decentralized network of computers which contains information
that can be shared with other computers on the network. 28
Much to the chagrin of publishers and distributors, some readers
may recall using or still use “BitTorrent” today to download
movies, music, books, or anything else. 29 Many media copyright
holders have brought legal actions against infringers using the
BitTorrent Network, presenting a slew of new issues courts must
handle. 30 The BitTorrent technology may be an easier medium
to illustrate how blockchain and Peer-to-Peer systems work and
why it can have a transformative effect on all ledgering
applications.
II.

BLOCKCHAIN ILLUSTRATION

To illustrate, let’s say an individual wants to download a
movie. In a traditional download, one would only connect to a
single entity-owned centralized server which contains the
information. 31 For example, if one downloads a movie from
iTunes, their computer would connect to Apple’s centralized
server network, and the information would be copied off the
single server to their computer. 32 In a Peer-to-Peer (commonly,
“P2P”) download, the information is taken from various servers
or computers. 33 To facilitate a Peer-to-Peer download, the user
installs a program which allows them to connect to other
computers on the Peer-to-Peer network. 34 After browsing the
catalog of “torrent files,” which are available for download, the
28. Dylan Love, Everything You Need to Know About BitTorrent, the Legal
(And Illegal) Way to Download Anything You Want, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 23,
2012, 11:28 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-bittorrent-2012-4.
29. Adam Pash & David Murphy, A Beginner’s Guide to BitTorrent,
LIFEHACKER (July 11, 2019, 4:00 PM), https://lifehacker.com/a-beginnersguide-to-bittorrent-285489.
30. Sean B. Karunaratne, Note, The Case Against Combating BitTorrent
Piracy Through Mass John Doe Copyright Infringement Lawsuits, 111 MICH.
L. REV. 283 (2012).
31. TCP (Transmission Control Protocol)—The Transmission Protocol
Explained,
IONOS
(Feb
3,
2020),
https://www.ionos.com/digitalguide/server/know-how/introduction-to-tcp/.
32. TCP and UDP Ports Used by Apple Software Products, APPLE (Aug.
27, 2019), https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202944.
33. See Rüdiger Schollmeier, A Definition of Peer-to-Peer Networking for
the Classification of Peer-to-Peer Architectures and Applications, 1 INT’L CONF.
ON PEER-TO-PEER COMPUTING 101, 101–02 (2002).
34. Love, supra note 28.
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user can find the movie they wish to watch. 35 Once the download
begins, the user’s computer will connect to other computers on
the network (called “nodes”) which contain the file the end-user
wants. 36 Hypothetically, with a Peer-to-Peer network, a user
could connect to thousands of nodes. 37 The user’s computer
would then only request and transfer an extremely small
amount of raw data from each individual node. 38 Once all the
information that a user needs to recreate the file on their
computer is downloaded from the multitude of individual nodes,
the user’s computer then recompiles the information into a
usable file on their computer. 39 The download is finished and
the user can enjoy “The Notebook,” 40 compiled from thousands
of nodes, in the comfort of their own home.
Blockchain uses a Peer-to-Peer network to verify and record
transactions. 41 Similar to the above, in a traditional centralized
financial transaction, when a consumer swipes their debit card
at a store, the transaction is relayed to a centralized server at
their bank. 42 The bank then recognizes the amount the
consumer wants removed from their account, verifies they have
that amount in their account, verifies the account that the
money is being paid to is receptive, and transfers the amount. 43
The bank then records the transaction on its internal ledgers,
with the money being subtracted from the consumer’s account
and added to the receiving account. 44
III. HOW BLOCKCHAIN WORKS
Blockchain transactions are also facilitated and verified by
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See Xiangying Yang & Gustavo de Veciana, Service Capacity of Peer
to Peer Networks, 4 IEEE INFOCOM 2242 (2004).
38. Love, supra note 28.
39. See Manoj Parameswaran et al., P2P Networking: An InformationSharing Alternative, 34 COMPUT. 31 (2001).
40. THE NOTEBOOK (Gran Via 2004).
41. Irani Acharjamayum et al., Blockchain: A Tale of Peer to Peer Security,
2018 IEEE SYMP. SERIES ON COMPUTATIONAL INTEL. (2018).
42. Susan Herbst-Murphy, Clearing and Settlement of Interbank Card
Transactions: A MasterCard Tutorial for Federal Reserve Payments Analysts,
FED. RSRV. BANK OF PHILA. (2013).
43. Id.
44. Id.
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several decentralized computers on a Peer-to-Peer network.
When a transaction occurs, the transaction is uploaded into a
general blockchain transaction pool. 45 The node then pulls a
group of transactions from the pool and compiles a number of
these transactions into a block. 46 The data contained within the
block is then converted into a cryptographic string of numbers
and characters (known as a “hash”). 47 Once a block is created,
the individual node tasks itself with solving a “cryptographic
puzzle.” 48 The speed it takes to solve this puzzle is directly
correlated with the amount of processing power that an
individual node supplies to the server. 49 In order to incentivize
node owners (known as “Miners”) to supply processing power
and energy to the system, the blockchain algorithm rewards a
random miner who has solved the cryptographic puzzle with
“cryptocurrency,” either Bitcoin or whichever currency is tied to
the specific blockchain the miner is mining for. 50 It is important
to note that, for a large swath of blockchains, only a fixed amount
of cryptocurrency can be mined. 51 After that fixed amount is
45. Greg Walker, Blocks: Collections of bitcoin transactions, LEARN ME A
BITCOIN (Feb. 26, 2015), https://learnmeabitcoin.com/beginners/blocks.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Shijie Zhang & Jong-Hyouk Lee, Analysis of the Main Consensus
Protocols of Blockchain, 6 ICT EXPRESS 93, 94 (2020) (explaining the process
known as a “Proof-of-Work” consensus protocol). Other methods of consensus
exist, such as Proof-of-Stake or Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance.
49. APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY AND NETWORK SECURITY CONFERENCE,
PROCEEDING NOTES FROM THE 5TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 407 (Jonathan
Katz & Moti Yung eds., 2007).
50. Melvin Draupnir, What Is the Bitcoin Mining Block Reward?,
BITCOINMINING.COM (May 6, 2016), https://www.bitcoinmining.com/what-isthe-bitcoin-block-reward/ (explaining the process of selecting a random miner
every ten minutes on the bitcoin blockchain); Alyssa Hertig, Can Ethereum
(Dec.
3,
2020,
1:52
PM),
Scale?,
COINDESK
https://www.coindesk.com/learn/ethereum-101/will-ethereum-scale (providing
an example of another blockchain, Ethereum, which awards a miner every
fifteen seconds).
51. The fixed amount depends on the algorithm of each blockchain. James
K. Darlington III, The Future of Bitcoin: Mapping the Global Adoption of
World’s Largest Cryptocurrency Through Benefit Analysis 9 (Apr. 21, 2014)
(B.A. thesis, University of Tennessee, Knoxville) (on file with the author). The
limited supply is intended to mimic currency which was previously tied to the
price of precious metals to reduce the possibility for rampant deflation when
the supply rises (which is where the term “mining” originates). Demelza Hays
& Andrés Coronado, Why Bitcoin Is Technically an Inflationary Currency—
Even Though Its Purchasing Power Is Increasing, FEE (Sept. 8, 2018),
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reached, miners will be rewarded with fees that are associated
with each individual transaction. 52
The transaction that the rewarded miner verified becomes
a part of the next verified block on the chain, and the ledger is
updated with that information. 53 That updated blockchain,
which includes all previous transactions and the new
transactions, becomes the accepted ledger and all following
transactions will only be verified if they contain that most recent
block. 54
This process removes the possibility of “double
spending,” an issue which arises when multiple computers on
the system have outdated ledgers. 55 Double spending allows a
person to spend an amount multiple times before the transaction
is verified by a number of nodes on the network. 56 Nodes on the
network must reach consensus with other nodes on the network
that they too have the most recently updated block and have
seen that transaction occur. 57 The new block becomes the
“standard” which all nodes must comply with. 58 If a node
receives a transaction which does not include the most updated
block, it must reject the transaction and restart the process. 59
This eliminates the risk of double spending. 60 All the computers
on the network receive the new block and verify that its log is
accurate to the new block it received. 61 In this way, the
blockchain can then confirm the information it received and
https://fee.org/articles/why-bitcoin-is-technically-an-inflationary-currencyeven-though-its-purchasing-power-is-increasing/.
52. Melvin Draupnir, How do Bitcoin Mining Fees Work?,
BITCOINMINING.COM (Apr. 29, 2016), https://www.bitcoinmining.com/bitcoinmining-fees/.
53. Draupnir, supra note 50.
54. Walker, supra note 45.
55. Usman W. Chohan, The Double-Spending Problem and
Cryptocurrencies (University of New South Wales, Discussion Paper Series:
Notes on the 21st Century, Discussion Paper, Jan. 6, 2021),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3090174.
56. Id.
57. Zhang, supra note 48.
58. Ameer Rosic, Blockchain Consensus: A Simple Explanation Anyone
Can Understand, BLOCKGEEKS, https://blockgeeks.com/guides/blockchainconsensus/ (last visited, Aug. 10, 2021).
59. Id.
60. Chohan, supra note 55.
61. Chris Hammerschmidt, Consensus in Blockchain Systems. In Short.,
MEDIUM (Jan. 27, 2017), https://medium.com/@chrshmmmr/consensus-inblockchain-systems-in-short-691fc7d1fefe.
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ensure the reliability of the information by sharing consensus
with the majority of the nodes. 62
The consensus the blockchain requires ensures the
reliability of the information in the blockchain. 63 In order for the
information to be altered in any way, a hacker or bad actor would
need to alter the information on the previously verified blocks,
and then it must have enough computing power (51%) to
override the consensus of all nodes that currently exist to ensure
the altered transaction would have consensus and be verified. 64
In addition to the astronomical amount of processing power and
capital required to control that amount of processing power, a
hacker would require to alter the blockchain, hackers are
disincentivized from hacking the system as the value of the
cryptocurrency is correlated to the “immutable” characteristic of
the blockchain. 65 If it were found in the general population that
the blockchain could be or was compromised, the value of the
currency would plummet, making the large capital investment
in processing power essentially worthless by leaving the hacker
with valueless currency. 66
While hacking the blockchain requires an immense amount
of processing power, it must be noted that smaller blockchains
with less miners and nodes are more greatly susceptible to
hacking. 67 In addition, tangential cryptocurrency marketplaces
are still susceptible to hacking due to the fact that these
tangential companies utilize traditional centralized servers. 68
The marketplace is currently working on solutions to create a

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Congcong Ye et al., Analysis of Security in Blockchain: Case Study in
51%-Attack Detecting, 5 INT’L CONF. ON DEPENDABLE SYS. & THEIR
APPLICATIONS (DSA) 15 (2018).
65. Venkata Marella et al., Understanding the Creation of Trust in
Cryptocurrencies: The Case of Bitcoin, 30 ELEC. MKTS. 259 (2020).
66. Jiarun Hu et al., The Fluctuations of Bitcoin Price during the Hacks,
3 INT’L J. APPLIED RSCH. MGMT. & ECON. 10 (2020).
67. How Blockchain Can Be Hacked: The 51% Rule and More, CIPHER,
https://cipher.com/blog/how-blockchain-can-be-hacked-the-51-rule-and-more/
(last visited, Aug. 10, 2021).
68. Rohit Gupta, Hacking Into Blockchain: Is Blockchain Security a
Concern?,
PLUGANDPLAY
(Apr.
30,
2019),
https://www.plugandplaytechcenter.com/resources/hacking-blockchainblockchain-security-concern.
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more robust and secure cryptocurrency and blockchain space. 69
In summation, blockchain can create a paradigm shift in the
way transactions are facilitated between consumers. Instead of
requiring a consumer to trust a bank with their information and
funds, blockchain users can utilize blockchain as an alternative
to the traditional banking service. 70 Because blockchain does
not rely on the centralization of the ledgering process and
instead spreads the ledger among all nodes within the system,
users may feel their information and/or funds are more secure
and less vulnerable to hacks or bad actors who have control of
these ledgers. 71 This gives a user solace in the belief that they
no longer must “trust” centralized banks, a fear which was
spawned out of the mistrust of banks during the 2008
recession. 72 A completely digital currency based on blockchain
has other desirable factors, such as fungibility, divisibility,
portability, and durability. 73 Fiat currency has always drawn
criticism, 74 but the motivation for Satoshi was cutting out the
untrustworthy banking system middleman and putting the
control back into the hands of consumers. 75
IV. PUBLIC, PRIVATE, AND PERMISSIONED BLOCKCHAINS
At this stage in the technology’s evolution, most blockchain
users are familiar with public blockchains. 76 These blockchains
69. Press Release, The Future of Crypto-Commerce and Cybersecurity:
AnChain.AI to Present at DEF CON 2019, BUS. INSIDER (July 16, 2019, 12:00
PM),
https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/the-future-of-cryptocommerce-and-cybersecurity-anchain-ai-to-present-at-def-con-20191028357609.
70. How Blockchain Could Disrupt Banking, CB INSIGHTS (Feb. 11, 2021),
https://www.cbinsights.com/research/blockchain-disrupting-banking/.
71. Marella, supra note 65.
72. Nakamoto, supra note 17.
73. John P. Kelleher, Why Do Bitcoins Have Value?, INVESTOPEDIA (June
30, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/100314/why-do-bitcoinshave-value.asp.
74. Detlev S. Schlichter, The Case Against Fiat Money, WALL ST. J.
(updated
Apr.
4,
2012,
12:01
AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303816504577319610353583
998.
75. Nakamoto, supra note 17.
76. Jamie Ballard, Four Out of Five Americans Are Familiar with at Least
One
Type
of
Cryptocurrency,
YOUGOV
(Sept.
24,
2019),
https://today.yougov.com/topics/finance/articles-
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are open to any member of the public to supply processing power
to the system. 77 Anyone with the will and investment capital
can purchase machines 78 that supply raw processing power to
the system (“mine”), giving them a chance to be awarded with
cryptocurrency. Additionally, public blockchains allow members
of the public to view all transactions that occur on the blockchain
(“explore”). 79
Any individual may also view the various
transactions that occur on the blockchain using an “explorer.” 80
Depending on which blockchain is being explored, the
information that can be obtained generally is the “account
information” 81 associated with both the transferor and
transferee, the amount being transferred, and a timestamp of
the transaction and information associated with the mining of
the transaction (i.e. hash and miner). 82 In this way, any person
who knows an “account holder’s cryptographic key” (known as a
“digital wallet address”) can see all transactions associated with
that key. 83 This gives the transactions that occur on a
blockchain a huge amount of transparency to the public. 84
While the information associated with the transfer is public,
reports/2019/09/24/cryptocurrency-bitcoin-americans-millennials-poll.
77. Toshendra Kumar Sharma, Public vs. Private Blockchain: A
Comprehensive Comparison, BLOCKCHAIN COUNCIL, https://www.blockchaincouncil.org/blockchain/public-vs-private-blockchain-a-comprehensivecomparison/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2021).
78. Although Bitcoin began with miners using their home personal
computers to mine, new machines, created with the sole purpose of mining
cryptocurrency (called Application Specific Integrated Circuits, commonly,
ASICs), are the gold standard for mining. Individuals are still welcome to mine
with their home PCs; however, the likelihood that a PC miner would be
awarded cryptocurrency is much lower as they do not have comparable speed
in solving the “cryptographic puzzles.” Gareth Jenkinson, GPUs And ASICs—
A Never Ending Battle For Mining Supremacy, COINTELEGRAPH (Apr. 18,
2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/gpus-and-asics-a-never-ending-battlefor-mining-supremacy.
79. Sharma, supra note 77.
80. Harsh Agrawal, What Is a Block/Blockchain Explorer?, COINSUTRA
(updated Aug. 15, 2020), https://coinsutra.com/blockchain-explorer/.
81. “Accounts” on a blockchain are not typically the same as an account
number in traditional banking transactions. Access to an “account” is a
function of having a “Cryptographic Key” which corresponds to a transaction
participant.
82. Agrawal, supra note 80.
83. Id.
84. Amera Ibrahim, Does Blockchain Mean Higher Transparency in the
Financial Sector?, 27 REVISTA DE CONTABILIDAD Y DIRECCIÓN 71, 79 (2018).
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information regarding the account holder is not. 85 To identify
who specifically is transferring or receiving the currency, one
must know the “public key hash” associated with the “account.” 86
This information is not publicly available, which requires
businesses to have first-hand knowledge and registration of
personal information. 87 Cryptocurrency companies are only in
the beginning stages of requiring such personal information to
be registered, if at all. 88 The lack of requiring this “account
holder information” has led to the use of cryptocurrencies for
illicit purposes. 89 One of the most infamous examples is the use
of Bitcoin by users of the Silk Road marketplace, an online black
market where users could purchase drugs, fake driver’s licenses,
stolen credit card information, child pornography, or a hitman,
amongst other things. 90
Such illicit uses of cryptocurrency have implicated concerns
regarding “Know Your Customer Requirements,” which stem
from the USA Patriot Act of 2001. 91
Legislators are
encountering difficulties in reigning in the “Wild West” period of
Cryptocurrencies. 92 These difficulties have slowed the adoption
85. Understanding
Bitcoin
Traceability,
BITCOIN.ORG,
https://bitcoin.org/en/protect-your-privacy#traceable (last visited Aug. 10,
2021).
86. Mike Orcutt, Criminals Thought Bitcoin Was the Perfect Hiding Place,
but They Thought Wrong, MIT TECH. REV. (Sept. 11, 2017),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2017/09/11/149211/criminals-thoughtbitcoin-was-the-perfect-hiding-place-they-thought-wrong/.
87. See, e.g., Blockchain Privacy Policy, BLOCKCHAIN.COM (last updated
Jan. 5, 2021), https://www.blockchain.com/legal/privacy.
88. Kai Sedgwick, 6 Cryptocurrency Exchanges That Don’t Require KYC,
BITCOIN.COM (Mar. 17, 2020), https://news.bitcoin.com/6-cryptocurrencyexchanges-that-dont-require-kyc/.
89. Sean Foley et al., Sex, Drugs, and Bitcoin: How Much Illegal Activity
Is Financed Through Cryptocurrencies?, 32 REV. FIN. STUD. 1798 (2019).
90. David Kushner, Dead End on Silk Road: Internet Crime Kingpin Ross
Ulbricht’s Big Fail, ROLLINGSTONE
(Feb. 4, 2012, 2:00 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culturenews/dead-end-on-silk-road-internet-crime-kingpin-ross-ulbrichts-big-fall122158/.
91. Dan Ryan, FinCEN: Know Your Customer Requirements, HARV. L.
SCH.
F.
ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
(Feb.
7,
2016),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/02/07/fincen-know-your-customerrequirements/.
92. Darryn Pollock, The Immutable and Unhackable Blockchain Still
Falling Prey to Cryptocurrency Wild West, FORBES (Mar. 20, 2019, 7:57 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/darrynpollock/2019/03/20/the-immutable-andun-hackable-blockchain-still-falling-prey-to-cryptocurrency-wild-west/.
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of cryptocurrency among general consumers and the Financial
Services industry at large. 93 In 2015, the New York Department
of Financial Services (“NYDFS”) began issuing “BitLicenses.” 94
These licenses are granted once an applying company in the
cryptocurrency market is within compliance with the statute. 95
The statute requires, inter alia, companies seeking licenses to
maintain records of “the identity and physical addresses of the
party or parties to the transaction that are customers or account
holders of the Licensee . . .,” 96 bringing the anonymity of the user
of cryptocurrency to an end. As of yet, there have only been a
limited number of “BitLicenses” issued. 97 At least one court case
has been filed challenging the NYDFS’s authority to regulate
Bitcoin; however, the case did not reach the merits, as the
petitioner did not have standing to file the suit. 98
A number of blockchains exist, which claim to more closely
protect the anonymity of the “account holder.” 99 When viewing
an explorer of these “Privacy-Oriented” blockchains, information
that would regularly be available to a user of an explorer of other
blockchains is obscured. 100 While not publicly viewable, this
account information is still stored on the chain and is within the
purview of information which can be subpoenaed. 101 While
“Privacy-Oriented” blockchains utilize anonymity protocols to
93. Clint Boulton, Blockchain Adoption in Banks Coming, but Slower than
Expected,
CIO
(Nov.
14,
2016,
6:39
AM),
https://www.cio.com/article/3140713/blockchain-adoption-in-banks-comingbut-slower-than-expected.html.
94. Press Release, New York State Dep’t of Fin. Servs., NYDFS
Announces Approval of First Bitlicense Application from a Virtual Currency
Firm
(Sept.
22,
2015),
https://www.dfs.ny.gov/reports_and_publications/press_releases/pr1509221.
95. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200.3 (2020).
96. N.Y. FIN. SERV. LAW § 200.15(e)(1)(i) (McKinney 2019).
97. Press Release, New York State Dep’t of Fin. Servs., DFS Grants
Virtual Currency and Money Transmitter Licenses to SoFi Digital Assets, LLC
(Dec.
3,
2019),
https://www.dfs.ny.gov/reports_and_publications/press_releases/pr1912031.
98. Chino v. N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., 100 N.Y.S.3d 1, 1–2 (App. Div.
2019).
99. See MONERO, https://www.getmonero.org (last visited Aug. 10, 2021).
The most well-known “Privacy-oriented” blockchain is Monero.
100. See, e.g., Malte Möser et al., Empirical Analysis of Traceability in the
Monero Blockchain, 3 PROC. ON PRIV. ENHANCING TECHS. 1 (2018).
101. See United States v. Gratkowski, 964 F.3d 307 (5th Cir. 2020)
(holding the Third-Party Doctrine applicable to records of Bitcoin
transactions).
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ensure user anonymity, they are under the umbrella of “Public”
blockchains as the mining is still controlled by public users. 102
“Private” and “Permissioned” blockchains differ because
access to both mining and exploring are given to a limited
number of partners within a consortium. 103 This has the
advantage of quickening the verification of transactions and
giving greater control to the members of the consortium. 104
However, the heightened degree of centralization of Private
blockchains creates a heightened risk of having a singular weak
point for attack. 105 Also, Private blockchains produce less
incentive to supply a greater amount of processing power to the
system, making it possible for a hacker or bad actor with control
over a great amount of processing power to overwhelm the
system and alter records. 106
Private and Permissioned
blockchains trade off the “immutability” of the system for a
greater degree of control of the verification of transactions.
In 2019, Facebook announced its move into the
cryptocurrency space. 107
Facebook intends to create a
cryptocurrency, named “Libra,” hosted on a Private blockchain
mined by a consortium it established called the “Libra
Association.” 108
Although Libra will not technically use
blockchain as the basis of its cryptocurrency, its verification
102. Paul de Havilland, The Best Privacy Coins: Crypto Briefing’s Top 10,
CRYPTOBRIEFING (Apr. 13, 2020), https://cryptobriefing.com/best-privacy-coinscrypto-briefings-top-10/.
103. See Shermin Voshmgir, Blockchains & Distributed Ledger
Technologies, BLOCKCHAINHUB BERLIN, as excerpted from the book SHERMIN
VOSHMGIR, TOKEN ECONOMY (2019), https://blockchainhub.net/blockchainsand-distributed-ledger-technologies-in-general/.
104. Joe Coburn, Public vs. Private Blockchains: Understanding the
Differences,
BLOCKS
DECODED
(Sep.
17,
2018),
https://blocksdecoded.com/public-private-blockchains/.
105. John Hintze, Blockchain May Have Weaknesses that Proponents
Overlook, ASS’N FIN. PROS. (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.afponline.org/ideasinspiration/topics/articles/Details/blockchain-may-have-weaknesses-thatproponents-overlook.
106. Id.
107. Josh Constine, Facebook Announces Libra Cryptocurrency: All You
Need
to
Know,
TECHCRUNCH
(June
18,
2019,
5:01
AM),
https://techcrunch.com/2019/06/18/facebook-libra/.
108. Katie Paul & Anna Irrera, Factbox: Facebook’s Cryptocurrency Libra
and Digital Wallet Calibra, REUTERS (Oct. 23, 2019, 10:49 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-cryptocurrency-factsfactbox/factbox-facebooks-cryptocurrency-libra-and-digital-wallet-calibraidUSKBN1X21Y0.
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algorithm still retains some resemblance to traditional
blockchain systems. 109 Facebook initially retained a large
number of global players within the association, but many of
them backed out, citing a lack of regulatory structure and
feasibility. 110 It is likely that Private blockchains will become
more prominent as mainstream adoption progresses. Financial
Service institutions, desiring greater control over all aspects of
their transaction facilitation, will likely utilize Private
blockchains, allowing them to claim the benefits of blockchain
while simultaneously retaining full control over their systems.
V.

ALTERNATE USES FOR BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY

At this point, this Comment has only discussed blockchain
in the context of financial systems and ledgering of transactions.
However, the raw processing power that miners supply to the
system need not be used only for financial transactions of the
currency that the blockchain rewards. There are multiple
potential applications, as blockchain is merely a technologically
advanced form of ledgering and record keeping. 111 We may see
a time when all record-keeping systems utilize either Public or
Private blockchains, but adoption is still in its infancy, even as
we see some of the largest tech companies make their foray into
the blockchain space. 112
One of the applications already underway is “Smart
Contracts.” 113 In 1994, prior to the formal introduction of
109. Rajarshi Mitra, What is Facebook Libra Cryptocurrency? [The Most
Comprehensive
Guide]—Part
1,
BLOCKGEEKS,
https://blockgeeks.com/guides/understanding-facebooks-cryptocurrency-libra/
(last visited Aug. 10, 2021).
110. Jeff John Roberts & Robert Hackett, Facebook’s Libra Coalition
Craters, as Visa, Mastercard, eBay, and Stripe Exit the Crypto Partnership,
FORTUNE (Oct. 11, 2019, 4:56 PM), https://fortune.com/2019/10/11/facebooklibra-partners-quit/.
111. See The Growing List of Applications and Use Cases of Blockchain
Technology in Business and Life, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 2, 2020, 12:24 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/blockchain-technology-applications-usecases.
112. Michael del Castillo, Big Blockchain: The 50 Largest Public
Companies Exploring Blockchain, FORBES
(July
3,
2018,
8:46
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaeldelcastillo/2018/07/03/big-blockchainthe-50-largest-public-companies-exploring-blockchain/#5e68fba2b5b2.
113. Nick Szabo, Smart Contracts: Building Blocks for Digital Markets,
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Bitcoin, a computer scientist, legal scholar, and cryptography
expert named Nick Szabo conceptualized and wrote an article
outlining the theory that computers can be used to execute
contracts. 114 He described smart contracts as “a set of promises,
specified in digital form, including protocols within which the
parties perform on these promises.” 115 Szabo viewed everyday
contractual obligations as being well within the realm of
computer processing systems. 116
For example, let’s say a general and subcontractor have an
agreement on a payment schedule. Payment is made as the
work progresses. With a smart contract, the obligations of both
parties can be coded within a separate program that runs on the
blockchain. 117 Once certain obligations are met, the contract will
self-execute and automatically make a payment to the
subcontractor. 118 The money held in escrow is automatically
released into the subcontractor’s account without the need to
write checks, verify payment information, or even create a tax
form. All of the contract necessities will be executed upon
completion of the performance of the contract.
Theoretically, the decentralized and immutable nature of
the contract will leave little room for “human error” in executing
the contract, making non-payment or late payment a thing of the
past. However, issues may arise during the coding of the
contract, which is analogous to today’s traditional contract
drafting. 119 The “rigidity” of the coded contracts may lead to a
relatively undesired effect; however, courts generally will be
16
EXTROPY
(1996),
http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Litera
ture/LOTwinterschool2006/szabo.best.vwh.net/smart_contracts_2.html
(partially rewritten).
114. See id; Nathanial Popper, Decoding the Enigma of Satoshi Nakamoto
TIMES
(May
15,
2015),
and
the
Birth
of
Bitcoin,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/17/business/decoding-the-enigma-ofsatoshi-nakamoto-and-the-birth-of-bitcoin.html.
115. Szabo, supra note 113.
116. See id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Stuart D. Levy & Alex B. Lipton, An Introduction to Smart Contract
and Their Potential and Inherent Limitations, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (May 26, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/05/26/anintroduction-to-smart-contracts-and-their-potential-and-inherentlimitations/.
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able to view the obligations of a contract with more clarity. 120
The only remaining issue is whether the smart contract’s code
truly reflects the parties’ intention when it was memorialized
rather than a lapse in execution which leads to a breach.
In addition to smart contracts, other legal services may be
served by the decentralization, visibility, immutability, and
trustless nature of blockchain technology. One industry that
may be on the chopping block due to the disruptive nature of
blockchain is the title insurance industry. 121 As it stands today,
real property title searches require an insurance reporter to
scour thousands of land records contained in County Clerk
offices across the country. 122 The industry is huge, raking in
billions every year by ensuring buyers are buying what the seller
owns, rather than what they might think they own. 123 In recent
years, the title insurance industry has drawn the ire of consumer
protection agencies and even some governmental authorities. 124
In fact, the state of Iowa created its own public title guarantee
service. 125
With blockchain, a parcel of land can be added to the
blockchain ledger land registry. This blockchain would most
likely be a government entity with public access, meaning that
the government will control the mining process while allowing
the public the ability to explore. 126 Every transaction, repair,
120. Max Raskin, The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts, 1 GEO. L.
REV. 305, 325 (2017) (citing CARL A. GUNTER, SEMANTICS OF PROGRAMMING
LANGUAGES: STRUCTURE AND TECHNIQUES 4 (1992)) (“When lawyers or the
programmers they hire write contracts in code, there is less of a chance for
ambiguity than in natural language if only for the simple fact that artificial
language must be complete and predefined, whereas natural language is
infinite.”).
121. Marc Shaw, Will the Power of Blockchain Mean the End of Title
Insurance Companies in 20 Years?, FORBES (June 22, 2018, 8:30 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesrealestatecouncil/2018/06/22/will-thepower-of-blockchain-mean-the-end-of-title-insurance-companies-in-20years/#6d58108d342a.
122. Id.
123. American Land Title Association, State Summary Market Share,
2016 TITLE INS. INDUS. DATA BOOK 1, 6 (2017), https://www.alta.org/industryresearch/data-book/2016-title-industry-data-book.pdf.
124. See FED. INS. OFF. U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, ANN. REP. ON THE INS. INDUS.
70 (2015).
125. See
generally
IOWA
FIN.
AUTH.,
http://www.iowafinanceauthority.gov/TitleGuaranty/Index (last visited Aug.
10, 2021).
126. Laura Shin, The First Government to Secure Land Titles on the

17

2021 BLOCKCHAIN IMPLICATIONS ON DISCOVERY

245

and capital improvement can be listed on the blockchain. If the
land registry blockchain is public, any individual will be able to
look up a property and see all important occurrences related to
the property. Public access to these registries will bring
efficiency and clarity to all transfers of property. When a longrunning, searchable log of every transaction which occurred
exists, and the validity of the log cannot be questioned due to the
nature of blockchain, the need for an industry to conduct indepth title searches will dissipate. The massive improvements
to efficiency that can result from applying blockchain to title
registries will have a significant effect on land title disputes.
At this point, the crux of this Comment has been reached.
When something occurs on the blockchain, whether it is
contractual obligations, title, or other potential applications
such as logistical tracking, how will individuals prove it in court?
Will blockchain ledger events require belabored discovery and
confirmation of the validity and accuracy of the event and
underlying processes which allow the blockchain to be explored?
Or will it be as simple as a judge taking judicial notice that such
an event occurred, or such obligation was met because of its
presence on a particular blockchain that is widely understood as
self-authenticating?
VI. DISCOVERY PROCEDURES FOR BANKING TRANSACTIONS
In 1976, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Miller,
primarily holding that individuals have no legitimate
“expectation of privacy” with respect to banking records. 127 The
Court reasoned that by utilizing banking systems, “the depositor
takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the
information will be conveyed by that person to the
Government.” 128 This holding affirmed the ability of banking
records to be subpoenaed and subject to traditional discovery by
adversarial parties in a proceeding. 129
While Miller directly dealt with criminal proceedings and
Bitcoin Blockchain Expands Project, FORBES (Feb. 7, 2017, 9:52 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2017/02/07/the-first-government-tosecure-land-titles-on-the-bitcoin-blockchain-expands-project/.
127. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
128. Id. at 443 (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751–52
(1971)).
129. Id. at 444.
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Fourth Amendment concerns, 130 the Federal Rules of Evidence
do not exempt banking records as privileged. 131 Analogously,
when a user engages in a transaction via blockchain, they
similarly “reveal their affairs” to a third party, bringing the
information within the scope of traditional discovery and
subpoena procedures. 132 While such information, which has
been transacted through a third party, can be used as evidence
at trial, the party moving for entrance of the evidence must still
lay a foundation for its admissibility. 133
Generally, this requires a representative from the bank to
determine that the record sought to be entered is authentic and
falls within the purview of the business records exception to
hearsay. 134 The necessity for this exists because chain of custody
issues are abound when dealing with a bank that has humans
who maintain the systems and compile reports. 135 This problem
could be avoided by using blockchain technologies, which
automatically report transactions to the public by their
blockchain explorer sites.
Insofar as admissibility is concerned, blockchain has not
reached a point where the general population is aware of the
immutability that is inherent in blockchain systems. As such,
admission of blockchain explorer sources may be challenged on
an authentication basis. Today, authentication of Electronically
Stored Information (“ESI”) is covered in the Federal Rules of
Evidence (“FRE”). 136 In December of 2017, Rule 902 of the FRE,
which governs the admissibility of “Evidence that is SelfAuthenticating,” was amended to add two new subsections: 13
and 14. 137 Rule 902(13) allows for the admissibility of “Certified
Records Generated by an Electronic Process or System.” 138 The
rule allows the admission of “record[s] generated by an electronic
process or system that produces an accurate result, as shown by
130. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
131. FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
132. United States v. Gratkowski, 964 F.3d 307 (5th Cir. 2020).
133. FED. R. EVID. 901.
134. Id.
135. Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Foundations and
Confrontations: Certifications and Custodial Witnesses, in 30 FED. PRAC. &
PROC. EVID. § 6637 (2d ed. 2021).
136. FED. R. EVID. 902(13)-(14).
137. FED. R. EVID. 902.
138. FED. R. EVID. 902(13).
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certification of a qualified person . . . [also subject to] the notice
requirements of Rule 902(11).” 139 Rule 902(14) allows copies of
such data to be admitted as long as the underlying process which
creates the copy is similarly certified by a qualified person. 140
The amendment is intended to simplify procedures by
allowing certification to be made by affidavit rather than lengthy
testimony. Without this amendment, if one sought to introduce
evidence which was pulled from a blockchain ledger, the party
seeking admission would be obligated to produce an expert who
could succinctly explain to the judge and jury how the inherent
structure of blockchain processes secure and verify both the
transaction and the “exploring” of that transaction. 141 The
expert would have to explain that there is no third party who
must “vouch” for the validity of the information because the
system itself creates logs by such processes. 142 After all,
blockchain information is merely electronically stored
information, but what makes it different is how the stored
information is secured and how the public has the ability to write
new information and view the information without having the
ability to alter any information previously written. 143
While blockchain technology is still in its infancy, this
process of hiring an expert to certify the process to lay a
foundation for the admissibility of the information contained on
the blockchain is necessary. However, there may come a time
where the technology itself, or individual blockchains, will
become so pervasive as to allow the court to merely take judicial
notice of the authenticity of the information on the blockchain.
As it stands now, courts are versed in procedures that allow
for certain electronically stored information to be produced in
admissible form through “eDiscovery Software.” 144
These
programs, however, are numerous, and each individual program
which produces, collects, or reports ESI, will require certification
by an expert who is versed on the processes of each individual
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. (emphasis added).
FED. R. EVID. 902(14).
FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
Id.
See Discussion, supra Part III.
See DEP’T JUST. & ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION (ESI) DISCOVERY PRODUCTION IN
FEDERAL
CRIMINAL
CASES
(Feb.
2012),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/finalesiprotocolbookmarked.pdf.
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program being used. 145 The sheer volume of programs and the
quickly evolving landscape surrounding the ESI sector do not
currently provide enough specificity for a judge to take judicial
notice of the processes of all the programs. The programs differ
enough in their processes to require that an expert certify why
this program should be trusted to do what it does. If an
adversary wishes to oppose admission of the evidence, they will
be obligated to present an expert witness to testify to the
underlying technical information regarding the processes which
report the information. 146
Individual blockchains, however, are different from the
numerous programs that a digital forensic investigator might
use in their suite of programs to get ESI to the judge and jury.
Throughout the years, programs come and go, processes are
changed or updated, and there may always be a different way
these programs function, requiring continual authentication of
the processes which lead to the production of ESI evidence. 147
There may come a time, however, where certain blockchains,
such as Bitcoin or Ethereum, become so ubiquitous that
certification of the processes becomes unnecessary due to its
pervasiveness. At some point in the future, the phrase “Bitcoin
transaction (or whichever blockchain is predominant at the
time) and exploring is secured and verified” may become as
common as the old standard “the sky is blue.” How likely is that?
Time will tell, but if every sci-fi movie ever created is to be
believed, the future will be a strange place where today’s
cutting-edge technology is as taken for granted as the color of
the sky. 148 Once we get there, will facts that exist on the
blockchain be subject to the concept of judicial notice?
VII. JUDICIAL NOTICE
Most lawyers are familiar with the concept of judicial notice.
Judicial notice has a long history within the courts. 149 The
145. FED. R. EVID. 902 (advisory committee notes to 2017 Amendments).
146. Id.
147. Bill Crane, Digital Forensics: A Decade of Changes, POLICE (Nov. 11,
2013),
https://www.policemag.com/374406/digital-forensics-a-decade-ofchanges.
148. See generally BACK TO THE FUTURE PART II (Universal Pictures 1989).
149. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT
THE COMMON LAW 279 (1898).
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concept allows the court to take notice of readily accessible or
publicly known information as adjudicative facts. The old
common law precepts of the rule were codified into the Federal
Rules of Evidence when they were put into effect in 1975. 150
Federal Rule 201 governs the ability of a judge to take notice of
certain adjudicative facts of two kinds: (1) facts “generally
known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction” (i.e., that
a street leads to a different street); or (2) facts that “can be
accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned” (i.e., the sky is blue). 151 Notice
of transactions which occur on a blockchain would fall within the
scope of the second category.
A judge may take notice at any stage of the proceeding, 152
either (1) of its own volition; or (2) if a party requests that notice
be taken and supplies the necessary information required. 153 A
party is entitled to be heard regarding the propriety of the
judge’s notice. 154 In civil cases, facts judicially noticed must be
accepted by the jury as conclusive, while in criminal cases the
court “must instruct the jury that it may or may not accept the
noticed fact as conclusive.” 155 The presumption of the facts
judicially noticed allows for a streamlining of the process in
laying the foundation for conclusive facts. To determine whether
“a source proffered as worthy of judicial notice is one whose
‘accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned,’ courts should look
to three factors: (1) the source’s knowledge of the subject matter,
(2) the source’s independence from relevant bias, and (3) the
source’s motivation to ensure accuracy of the posted
information.” 156
In their application to blockchain, these factors lead one to
believe that information stored on a certain blockchain is within
the purview of judicially noticeable fact. The first factor
analyzes the source’s knowledge of the subject matter. 157 With
150. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975)
(establishing the Federal Rules of Evidence).
151. FED. R. EVID. 201(b).
152. FED. R. EVID. 201(d).
153. FED. R. EVID. 201(c).
154. FED. R. EVID. 201(e).
155. FED. R. EVID. 201(f).
156. Jeffrey Bellin & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Trial by Google: Judicial
Notice in the Information Age, 108 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 1137, 1140 (2014).
157. Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/6

22

250

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 41.2

blockchain, it cannot be questioned whether a blockchain has
knowledge of the transaction in issue. 158 Blockchain explorers
directly reflect the transaction that occurred. 159 The blockchain
has intimate knowledge of which public key holders the
transaction occurred between, what transaction or sums were
transferred, and when the transaction occurred. 160
Seemingly, this is only possible on a purely public
blockchain where all information is freely available to the public.
Privacy-Oriented, Private, and Permissioned blockchains all
have an additional layer of protection which guards the public
key holder’s information. 161 As such, the ability of the court to
take judicial notice of transactions on these blockchains is
significantly diminished. A Private or Permissioned blockchain
may still allow public exploration, 162 if not, however,
transactions which occur on these blockchains will generally
require the third party which controls such information to be
subpoenaed. At this point, we are left solely with blockchains
that allow for public exploration of its transactions. Luckily, at
the present time, the majority of financial blockchain
transactions (cryptocurrency) are taking place on public
blockchains umbrella and are still subject to analysis of the
remaining factors. 163
The second factor is the source’s independence from relative
bias. 164 This factor again brings the remaining blockchains
within judicial notice purview. Explorer outputs are merely a
function of reporting the transactions which occurred on the
blockchain. 165 The blockchain is unable to output information in
a misleading way. 166 This technology is not subjected to
prejudice or bribery. Blockchain has no implicit biases. Indeed,
158. See supra Part IV.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Similar to our example of a Governmental Blockchain Land Title
Registry, see supra Part V.
163. In the future, this is likely to change. Deloitte’s 2019 Global
INSIGHTS
30
(2019),
Blockchain
Survey,
DELOITTE
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/se/Documents/risk/DI_2019global-blockchain-survey.pdf.
164. Bellin, supra note 156.
165. Agrawal, supra note 80.
166. See supra Part IV.
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the explorer is merely a reported representation of the
transactions which occurred on the blockchain and is outputted
as a matter of course. 167 This factor weighs in favor of allowing
judicial notice.
The third factor, the source’s motivation to ensure accuracy,
also militates toward judicial noticeability. 168 The entire
premise of blockchain technology is underpinned by its
immutable characteristics. Consortiums which design and
engineer blockchains have the sole motivation to ensure the
accuracy of the information which is contained on the
blockchain. 169 Indeed, the invention of this technology in 2008
was directly motivated by the market manipulation and
disingenuous practices that the centralized global players were
partaking in. 170 The engineering of this technology arose
directly out of a backlash for the inaccurate reporting done by
centralized financial institutions. 171 The creators of blockchains
and those who participate in the blockchain market by
transacting in cryptocurrency utilize blockchain for its
immutable characteristics. 172 Cryptocurrencies are not subject
to the control of “banking cartels” that many tinfoil hat wearing
conspiracy theorists believe exist. 173 The rising value of
cryptocurrencies over the long term show that many are seeking
alternatives to a banking and economic system they believe is
rigged.
Additionally, the tangible value of blockchain and
cryptocurrency assets is based upon the premise that the
information on the blockchain is immutable. 174 The engineers
which create blockchains are directly motivated to ensure that
the information stored on the blockchain is reliable and
accurate. 175 If this was not the case, the time, money, and effort
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
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Bellin, supra note 156.
See supra Part III.
Nakamoto, supra note 17.
See supra Part I.
See supra Part III.
Kimberly Amadeo, Who Really Owns the Federal Reserve?, THE
BALANCE (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.thebalance.com/who-owns-the-federalreserve-3305974.
174. See supra Part III.
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and Needs of Blockchain Software Developers: A Survey, 24 EMPIRICAL
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that went into the creation of the blockchain would be destroyed.
Traditionally, the programmers which create blockchain
technology are also the first miners of the currency. 176 When
they started mining, the value of the currency was so low that
many were rewarded with huge lots of cryptocurrency. 177 The
value of their labor in programming and mining was paid in
cryptocurrency. 178 Many of these originators have amassed
huge amounts of cryptocurrency. 179 They are incentivized to not
have the value of cryptocurrency fall precipitously, which it
would, if it were found that the blockchain was unreliable. 180
The creators of each individual blockchain have a huge
motivation to ensure the information which is stored on the
blockchain is accurate, as long as they are not engaged in their
own fraudulent conduct, which the cryptocurrency space is
currently rife with. 181 However, as the sector matures and large
institutions enter the space, these types of scheming
opportunists should be eliminated by the market forces of laissez
faire capitalism and government regulations of the American
mixed economy.
Accordingly, some, but not all, blockchains may allow for the
information which it contains to be judicially noticed. What will
be important in determining whether a particular blockchain is
subject to judicial notice is (1) the pervasiveness of the particular
blockchain, (2) whether the particular blockchain is public and
can be explored, and (3) the particular blockchain’s adherence to
the fundamental motivations of blockchain technology. Not all
uses of blockchain technology will be subject to judicial notice.
SOFTWARE ENG’G 2636 (2019).
176. The Satoshi Fortune, WHALE ALERT (July 20, 2020),
https://medium.com/@whale_alert/the-satoshi-fortune-e49cf73f9a9b
(estimating the value of Satoshi’s bitcoin holdings at $10.9 billion).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Mike Dalton, Whale Watching: Which Crypto Wallets Have the
Biggest
Balances?,
BITRATES
(June
19,
2020,
9:39
PM),
https://www.bitrates.com/news/p/whale-watching-which-crypto-wallets-havethe-biggest-balances.
180. Ziyao Liu et al., A Survey on Blockchain: A Game Theoretical
Perspective, 7 IEEE ACCESS 47615 (Apr. 2019).
181. Paul Vigna & Eun-Young Jeong, Cryptocurrency Scams Took in More
than $4 Billion in 2019, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 10, 2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/cryptocurrency-scams-took-in-more-than-4billion-in-2019-11581184800.

25

2021 BLOCKCHAIN IMPLICATIONS ON DISCOVERY

253

However, one can imagine a future where blockchain technology
is so pervasive that judicial notice of such transactions will lead
to a more cost-effective way to admit such evidence.
VIII. PUBLIC POLICY OF COST SAVING
The judiciary does not stand as an inflexible institution
condemned to hand down authoritative proscriptions from on
high. The judiciary strives for flexibility and the ability to adapt
to the ever-changing landscape of its jurisdiction. This is
important because as a process or function in society becomes
standardized, courts are not resigned to remain blind to the
ongoing evolution. Processes change, become cheaper, and more
readily accessible to the common person. Courts regularly cite
public policy to update their principles to the realities of
modernity. 182 As social norms and technologies evolve, courts
hope to be a part of that evolution.
One of the most prolific examples of the desire for
technological adaptation is the Public Access to Court Electronic
Records
(“PACER”)
(also
known
as
Case
Management/Electronic Case Files (“CM/ECF”)). In response to
the invention and proliferation of the internet, courts took the
opportunity to streamline and update their procedures. 183
Today, litigants no longer must run to the courthouse before the
eve of the expiry of the statute of limitations. Filing an action is
as simple as uploading a PDF and making an online purchase.
The federal court revels in the new availability, cost
effectiveness, efficiency, and archivability the expansion of
CM/ECF has created. 184 Most importantly, the public policy of
efficiency of the judicial economy is well served by this
transition. Not only does the court require less clerks to receive
the filings, but also less backend work of organizing and
182. Judicial Conference of the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 331 (codifying
the establishment of the Judicial Conference, the judicial rulemaking
authority tasked with “promot[ing] simplicity in procedure, fairness in
administration, the just determination of litigation, and the elimination of
unjustifiable expense and delay”).
183. See 25 Years Later, PACER, Electronic Filing Continue to Change
Courts, U.S. CTS. (Dec. 9, 2013), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2013/12/09/25years-later-pacer-electronic-filing-continue-change-courts.
184. See About Us, PACER, https://www.pacer.gov/about.html (last
visited Aug. 10, 2021).
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delivering the filings to the specific court part. Parties upload
their information directly to the case files which are available to
the court. 185 Courts can even set alerts to learn when a new
filing has been uploaded. 186
Courts are not concerned only with management of the
public purse. Courts also desire to ensure that litigants are not
throwing their money away in protracted litigation. Fee
shifting, dismissal and sanction of frivolous case files, a desire
for and implementation of settlement conferences, inter alia, all
stand as evidence of the courts’ desire to save litigants money.
The use of judicial notice also serves this goal. Judicial notice
allows the court to avoid the cost of a litigant to procure the
testimony of someone with knowledge. Judicial notice allows
streamlined procedures permitting litigants to focus on the
actual issues in contest.
In this context, judicial notice of transactions which occur
on the blockchain will allow for more streamlining of the
procedure. This may be extremely important in a future where
blockchain is the underlying structure of many of the ledgering
systems. One can imagine a case where information on various
blockchains is necessary to the outcome of the trial. With the
court taking judicial notice of the propriety of the information,
which was pulled from the blockchain, the court could avoid
numerous days of foundation laying, cut through the procedural
red-tape, and get directly to the issues at hand.
IX. CONCLUSION
Blockchain is considered a disruptive technology. The
widespread use of blockchain will usher in a paradigm shift in
how our society stores, retrieves, logs, and interacts with huge
swaths of data. We are recording more information than ever
before, and because of the sheer mass of these databases, the
courts should look to ways to streamline the processes as it
relates to presenting the information contained on these
185. See
Electronic
Filing
(CM/ECF),
U.S.
CTS.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/court-records/electronic-filing-cmecf (last visited
Aug. 10, 2021).
186. See FAQs: Case Management / Electronic Case Files, U.S. CTS.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/court-records/electronic-filing-cmecf/faqs-casemanagement-electronic-case-files-cmecf (last visited Aug. 10, 2021).
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databases.
Blockchain was born out of a simple motivation—to make
the ledgering of our transactions transparent, immutable,
trustless, and decentralized. The ideal of blockchain is similar
to the ideals of the American founding fathers. Consolidation
and centralization can lead to corruption and a lack of
accountability, leaving victims with no recourse. The blockchain
system was created to bring the power to the masses as an
alternative to the massive, unwieldy financial system we have
today.
As the technology carries into differing ledgering systems,
the ideals which spawned the creation of the technology will
follow, hard coded into the processes. The technology itself is a
reflection of its invention. So much so that the accuracy of the
information that it produces cannot be questioned. While ESI
currently requires certification from an expert for the
underlying processes of the software that organizes information
and reports it, soon enough all information will be ESI, and the
courts will have the opportunity to streamline procedures again.
Judicial notice can be one of the tools the court has at its disposal
to streamline litigation, saving the litigants and the court time
and money.
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